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ABSTRACT  Beyond its fundamental role of information, education and entertainment, the 
 Nigerian press since the colonial period has always been the vanguard of human rights. That the 
press functions as the watchdog of human rights is generally acknowledged, there has been little 
research given to this. Its role as the guardian of human rights and the voice of the  voiceless 
strained its relations with Nigerian military dictators, also led to the suffocation of its breathing 
space. Despite numerous measures calculated to muzzle the press in Nigeria by the military 
 dictators, Nigerian press has always remained committed. This paper studies the  history of the 
Nigerian press and its role in human rights agitation by focusing on the oldest surviving private 
newspaper, The Nigerian Tribune under three military regimes between 1984 and 1998.
Key Words: Press freedom; Social responsibility; Human rights; Military regimes and 
 decrees.
INTRODUCTION
I.  Theoretical Frameworks: Authoritarian, libertarian and Social Responsibility 
 Theories
The bias for the study of government-media relations has generated different 
theories such as the authoritarian and the libertarian media theories, and led to 
the adaptation of the holistic theories such as the hegemony theory. Hitherto, the 
Nigerian press has been studied primarily from the perspectives of hegemonic 
theory, authoritarian theory or libertarian theory (Mohammed, 2003; Ogbondah, 
1994; Olukotun, 2002; Oloyede, 2004). Whereas, most of these studies on the 
press have been confined to the government-media relations, these were at the 
expense of the basic functions of the press in the society, particularly the role of 
human rights activism and the performance of the press. This also explains the 
poverty of research, despite loud publicity on the impact of the media on human 
rights activism. A few clues can be derived from the simplest questions of  Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm (1956: 1).(1)
Why is the Nigerian press the way it is? Why does it apparently serve  different 
purposes and appear in widely different forms under different administrations, 
whether civilian or military?
The answer to the above questions would partly be that the behaviour of the 
Nigerian press reflects the socio-political structure and dynamics of the society 
at different historical epochs. It could also reflect “what people do in different 
places and what their experience lead them to want to need about” (Siebert et 
al., 1956: 1). The degree of access the public has to, control and the ownership 
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of the press are also ready answers to the above questions. In addition, the in-
house policy and the ideological belief of the press ownership affected the operation 
and the final output of the media house. The author’s in this study is thus similar to 
that of Siebert et al. (1956: 1–2) “that the press always takes on the form and 
 coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates.”
This study has been erected on the social responsibility theory of media. The 
general story of the autocratic tendency of the military regimes and libertarian 
disposition of civilian governments to the press in Nigeria becomes feeble if 
placed on the weight of the media social responsibility theory. The history of the 
Nigerian press could as well be situated under the authoritarian media theory.
What then is authoritarian media theory? What is libertarian media theory? 
What is social responsibility theory? Simply put, authoritarian media refers to a 
situation where government controls, censors or muzzles the press by regulating 
the contents of publications through its various agents of laws. The features of 
authoritarian media include, direct government control of production, the use of 
economic sanctions, such as taxation, prohibition or controlled import of foreign 
media, government appointment of editorial staff, and enforced codes of conduct 
(Okunna, 1999: 124–125).
The conception of authoritarian media theory dated back to the reign of  absolute 
monarchies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Europe in which the Tudors 
in England, the Bourbons in France, and the Hapsburg in Spain adopted the prin-
ciple to control their press (Siebert et al., 1956: 9). The government-media rela-
tion of the time was sadly characterized by absolute censorship. The authoritarian 
philosophy views the press as the instrument of government propaganda. Under 
authoritarian governments, criticism of government’s policy was strongly  prohibited. 
The 1644 areopagitica of John Milton adequately depicted the authoritarian  British 
government muzzling of the press.(2) Four basic strategies were put in place to 
regulate the press: the patent system, the journeymen system, censorship and 
 treason or sedition trials (Okunna, 1999: 124–125). Under the patent system, licenses 
or permits were used to control the press. The Journeymen system  controlled the 
press by regulating the number of apprentices to printers of newspapers.  Censorship 
can be divided into two: Pre-censorship and post-censorship. While the former has 
to do with the formal approval of the materials before printing, the latter is con-
cerned with the approval of the materials after publication. The sedition trial has 
to do with the punishment of the guilty printers through the framework of law 
(Okunna, 1999: 126–127). Authoritarian media theory can be summarized to mean 
a situation where government controls, censors or  muzzles the press by regulating 
the contents of publications through its various agents of laws.
The libertarian concept of press freedom has received much attention of schol-
ars as well. According to Stein, a free press is that which acts as a market place 
where ideas, opinions and theories are served up to citizens for their acceptance 
or rejection, with the absence of government intervention (Stein, 1966). To Powe 
(1991), it is editorial liberty from government that will encourage the press to 
perform its Fourth Estate role. The major initiators of the libertarian philosophy 
included John Milton, Thomas Jefferson and Stuart Mill. The theory assumed that 
man possessed the capacity to choose between what is right, factual and what is 
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false. The philosophy also emphasized natural and inalienable rights to judiciously 
determine the truth. While the purpose of the libertarian press was to inform, 
entertain, educate, sell and to monitor government activities, the press enjoyed 
negative rights to publish as it deemed fit with no concomitant responsibility 
(Siebert et al., 1956: 39–71). Thus, where there was free flow of ideas and infor-
mation the propensity was very high for the abuse of freedom of press by the 
few who as a result of their fortune have ready access to it.
II. The Social Responsibility Theory
What are the factors responsible for the irresponsibility of some sections of the 
press? Why do the journalists fail to religiously observe the ethics of journalism?
Folarin (Nigerian Tribune, 28 July 1989: 4) posited:
as a general concept social responsibility describes an organization’s or a 
system’s consciousness that one has a stake in the fortunes of the larger 
society or distinct from, and in addition to the stake one has in one’s 
 personal fortunes or fortunes of specific in groups such as family, ethnic 
grouping or tribe...
Siebert et al. (1956) posited that social responsibility was the obligation of the 
press “to see that all sides are fairly presented and that the public has enough 
information to decide; and that if the media do not take on themselves such 
responsibility it may be necessary for some agency of the public to enforce it.”
The underlying principle of the social responsibility theory of media is that 
where the press fails to exercise self-censorship, government or an established 
institution should check the recklessness of the press. The Hutchins Commission 
held the press freedom as positive rights that required concomitant responsibili-
ties. Thus, scholars Siebert, Peterson, Schramm and Folarin not only put the  public 
interest as the epicentre of their definitions, they also were of the position that 
when a punitive media law was sometimes enacted, it was to ensure social respon-
sibility on the part of the media (NT, 28 July 1989: 4). Thus commissions and 
the enactment of punitive media law were seen as attempts to maximize the social 
responsibility of the press.
Historically, the social responsibility theory was rooted in the Hutchins Commis-
sion Report on Free and Responsible Press of 1947. The deviation of the press 
from the libertarian principle and the “marketplace of ideas,” as advocated in the 
writings of John locke, John Stuart Mill, John Milton and Thomas  Jefferson, to 
irresponsible and yellow journalism necessitated the establishment of Hutchins Com-
mission in 1942 by the Time Magazine founder, Henry luce. According to this 
commission, newspapers should redefine themselves along the following lines:
•  A truthful, comprehensive account of the day’s events in a context which gives 
them meaning.
•  A forum for the exchange of comments and criticisms.
•  A means of projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in a society to 
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one another.
•  A way of reaching every member of the society by the currents of  information, 
thought, and feelings which the press supplies.
Despite almost immediately rejecting the Hutchins Commission Report, Seibert 
et al. found it very useful to propound upon it a theory of social responsibility 
which inevitably ushered in the end of the “public be damned” effects of  libertarian 
media theory and the authoritarian theory of the press. But it is significant to 
note that social responsibility theory is not without its weaknesses. Much of the 
criticism against social responsibility theory came from proponents of free  market 
place of ideas. According to the libertarians, “the existence of regulatory com-
missions, councils, ombudsman or other frameworks are unnecessary” (Middleton, 
2009). For instance the American Newspaper Publishers Association denounced 
the Hutchins Commission Report, which eventually metamorphosed into as “an 
entering wedge for government control of the media” (Nerone, 2002). Some other 
critics of the theory also argued that the social responsibility theory amounted 
“to sterile intellectual exercise on one hand and an apparent spontaneous ideo-
logical development on the other” (Nerone, 2002). Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
argued that Siebert et al. assumed the press to be a dependent variable on the 
system of control which it reflects, rather than treating it as an institution that is 
impacted and has impact on other social structures (Hallo & Mancini, 2004). The 
formulation of the theory by Siebert et al., they argued, was thus ironically  similar 
to the Marxist traditional base-and-superstructure thesis. They also faulted the 
theory for the weakness to empirically analyze the relation between media  systems 
and social systems (Hallo & Mancini, 2004: 9).
Given the fact that no press is infallible of the weaknesses of the laissez faire 
media system, the tendency is strong for the press prejudice to favour its patrons. 
There are at least five factors that account for the irresponsibility of the press. 
There is an assumption among the journalists that nothing is news worthy unless 
it is bizarre and novel. It is under this assumption that many journalists slant 
news reports. To such newspapers, bad news is good news. Thus, many newspa-
pers became the victims of law of defamation or new gag laws. The assumption 
has adversely affected the philosophy of many newspapers.
The question of timing is another factor. It is believed that for anything to be 
worth publishing in the newspapers, it has to be recent, not stale. The freshness 
of news reports would not only sell the newspaper very fast, it was assumed, but 
would also help secure the loyalty of its readers. Adherence to this principle has 
complicated many newspapers in Nigeria in law-suits with the government and 
sometimes provoked the promulgation of a new gag law. Sadly, most news reports 
were published under speculative rather than investigative reporting principles.
Perhaps economic consideration was another contributing factor. In the face of 
unhealthy rivalry among the newspapers, there was blatant disrespect for the pro-
fessional ethics of journalism. Although ethical responsibility is a matter of  personal 
morality, it nonetheless determines how socially responsible journalists and news-
papers are. The struggle to stay in business, make even, and fulfill financial 
 obligations such as the payment of bills and salary, have affected the operation 
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of many newspapers in Nigeria to the extent of resorting to reckless reporting.
Nevertheless, the social responsibility theory of the media possesses a few 
strengths. The theory has taken into consideration the risk of monopolization of 
a libertarian or laissez faire media system in which certain sections of the  society 
with economic and political strengths dictate and dominate the form and the 
 channel of information dissemination. The adoption of social responsibility theory 
also indicates “a radical reconstruction of the relationship between individuals and 
communities, with a new emphasis on the latter … social responsibility  represents 
the triumph of community over the lone individual” (Nerone, 2002: 185). The 
idea of self-regulation of the libertarian media system becomes feasible if the 
performance of the press under the media codes of ethic is well scrutinized. Media 
ethics codes are often jettisoned by journalists as there is no formal structure or 
punitive action against the violators. Sadly in most cases, ethics codes are mere 
veneers to insulate the questionable behaviour of journalists. Hence, the social 
responsibility theory of media proposes that the media take it upon itself to raise 
standards, or otherwise a public agent such as the (state) may take steps to  regulate 
the media.
The author adopts the social responsibility theory for this study to maintain a 
middle-of-the-ground position between recognition of the arbitrary violation of 
press freedom by the authoritarian regimes and the abuse of press freedom by 
the press in a libertarian atmosphere.
MAIN TRENDS IN THE HISTORy OF NIGERIAN PRESS, 1859–1983
In 1859, Iwe Irohin (Iwe Irohin fun awon ara Egba ati Yoruba), the first news-
paper in Nigeria was established at Abeokuta by Reverend Henry Townsend. 
Although Iwe Irohin was a missionary newspaper established to spread the  influence 
of Christianity among the native people, it had distinguished features of incisive-
ness and pungency. Iwe Irohin, was a vigorous crusader against the evils of slave 
trade, and staunchly argued for legitimate trade and commerce of produce and 
merchandise instead of human beings (Coker, 1968: 2; Duyile, 2004: 14).
The sprouting of more newspapers in lagos with the birth of the Lagos Times 
and Gold Coast Colony Advertiser in November 1880 marked the beginning of 
press fertility in Nigeria. Radical newspapers such as the Lagos Observer (4 Feb-
ruary 1882, by J. Blackball Benjamin), the Eagle and Lagos Critic (31 March 
1883, by Owen Emerick Macaulay), Lagos Weekly Record (1 January 1891, by 
John Payne Jackson), the Lagos Standard (6 September 1894, by George Alfred 
Williams) and the Nigerian Times (5 April 1910, by James Bright Davies) dom-
inated the history of Nigerian press towards the close of 19th century and the 
beginning of 20th century. By the turn of the century, the radical potential of the 
Nigerian press was no longer in doubt. These newspapers became the critics of 
European imperialism in Africa. Among these nationalist newspapers, the Lagos 
Weekly Record and the Nigerian Times were perhaps the most incisive in term 
of editorial style and philosophy.
Significantly, the nationalist newspapers in Nigeria played remarkable roles in 
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the surge of cultural nationalism that dominated the 1890s in West Africa. Their 
cultural nationalism was “the rediscovery of ethnic and cultural identity on the part 
of the repatriates as well as in the frustration and disillusionment created in the 
minds of the Africans by the hypocrisy and racial arrogance of church and colo-
nial administrators” (Omu, 1978: 107). A number of factors were responsible for 
this. Perhaps the most direct inspiration for cultural nationalism first came from of 
E.W. Blyden’s Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race published in london in 1887. 
Blyden’s visit to lagos in December 1890 was also a significant source of excite-
ment and motivation for the corps of Nigerian nationalists and journalists. Second, 
the cultural renaissance was a reaction to the introduction of the Education Ordi-
nance of 1882 that made the reading and writing of English language compulsory. 
Third, cultural nationalism represented a specially felt resentment by the Anglicized 
Africans towards the attitude of racial prejudice and discrimination by the Europe-
ans (Coleman, 1986: 145–152). Thus, cultural nationalism as championed by the 
press was expressed in the promotion of African language, literature, songs and 
dances, dress, and names (Coleman, 1986; Omu, 1978).
It is significant to note that, throughout the colonial period in Nigeria, the 
 relationship between the British colonial government and the press was not 
 congenial. The first repressive measure adopted by the colonial administration 
against the press was the use of economic sanction. An attempt to impose  taxation 
on lagos newspapers in 1862 by Governor H.S. Freeman was stalled by the 
Colonial Secretary of State. But in 1903, a subtle but more legitimate measure 
was adopted by the colonial administration in lagos (Omu, 1978: 17–182). This 
was the Newspaper Ordinance of 1903. Among other things, the ordinance required 
the registration of every newspaper and the swearing to an affidavit before the 
Registrar of the Supreme Court. Payment of ₤250 bond by one or more sureties 
approved by the Attorney-General was mandated by the ordinance. It also became 
compulsory for every newspaper to carry an imprint clearly stating the names 
and addresses of the printers and publishers as well as delivery of signed copies 
to the Chief Registrar in no later than six days of publication. A fine of twenty-
five pounds was imposed on anybody who violated the Ordinance (Coker, 1968: 
511–552).
The promulgation of the Seditious Offences Ordinance of 1909 was another 
instance of a repressive measure against the press. The promulgation of the Ordi-
nance was not unconnected with the press reaction to the introduction of the land 
Acquisition Ordinance in late 1907 and water tax on the indigenous people of 
lagos (Coleman, 1986: 179–180). Under the Ordinance, it became a punishable 
offence for anybody to publish, circulate either written or spoken, sign or visual 
representations that could bring or attempt to bring hatred or contempt or feeling 
of hatred against any person or group in the southern Nigeria (Omu, 1978: 186). 
By 1916, the new Criminal Code lengthened the punishment for seditious offense 
from 2 to 3 years for the first offender and seven for repeat offenders (Coker, 
1968: 53).
Despite the repressive measure against the press in the colonial Nigeria, the 
Nigerian press did not sit tamely. This became evident in the proliferation and 
fertility of newspapers and nationalist journalists in Nigeria until 1960. There 
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were however a few cases of repression such as the 6-months conviction and 
 fining (£100) of James Davies on 9 February and 6 November 1916 and  Herbert 
Macaulay in 1928. Nigerian journalists were also repressed on the ground of 
scandalizing the court or judges.
In 1925, the Lagos Daily News, the first daily newspaper in Nigeria, was estab-
lished by Victor Bababomi. It was later acquired and edited by Herbert Macaulay 
(Nwankwo et al., 1993: 15). The Lagos Daily News was popular for its fiery 
criticism and uncompromising stand against colonialism. The introduction of the 
West African Pilot in 1937 published by the veteran journalist and nationalist, Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikwe also marked the beginning of a new epoch in the history of 
Nigerian press. Azikwe revolutionized production techniques in Nigerian journal-
ism. He is credited with the introduction of tabloid style technique, sensational 
banner headlines, photographs, sport news and the use of block paragraphing 
(Ciboh, 2007: 18). More importantly, Azikwe was the first to introduce the news-
paper chain in Nigeria. Through his Associated Newspapers of Nigeria ltd., he 
established the Eastern Nigerian Guardian (1940), the Nigerian Spokesman (1943), 
the Southern Nigerian Defender (1943), absorbed the Comet in 1945, and created 
the Northern Advocate and the Sentinel in 1955 (Ciboh, 2007: 18–19).
Another newspaper that championed the course of human rights activism in 
colonial Nigeria was the Nigerian Tribune (NT). Founded by Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo in 16 November 1949 at Ibadan. The NT competed favorably with 
lagos newspapers. As with Azikwe (Zik), Awolowo, through his Amalgamated 
Press ltd., established his own newspapers group. These included the Daily  Service 
(later changed to the Daily Express), the Advocate, the Mid-West Echo, the  Middle 
Belt Herald, the Bornu People, the Northern Star, the Eastern Observer and the 
Iwe Irohin (Nwankwo et al., 1993: 16).
Significantly, the involvement of both Zik and Awolowo in Nigerian press 
 heralded in two remarkable developments. Both nationalists re-cultivated the 
 tradition and habit of human rights activism and anti-colonial campaign which 
the Nigerian press was known for. However, the cut-throat competition that existed 
between the Zik Group of Newspapers and the Amalgamated Press Newspapers 
marked the beginning of newspapers’ involvement in ethnic and partisan politics 
in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2007). While Zik Newspapers led by the Pilot openly  supported 
the National Council of Nigerian and Cameroon (NCNC) and the Ibo State Union, 
Awolowo’s newspapers led by the Tribune served as the mouth organ of the 
Action Group (AG) and Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a pan-ethnic union. Not only that, 
both newspaper groups also identified with the ethnic groups of their founders. 
So strong was the press war between the two groups that no word was spared 
to denigrate the leaders of the opposing party (Alimi, 2011). Hence, the  combative 
position of the Nigerian press towards the British colonial government was grad-
ually shifted towards the political opponents.
Early post-independent Nigeria (1960–1965) experienced a continuation of  ethnic 
bickering and political rivalry in which the press could not be absolved. Beyond 
this, there was also sprouting of government owned newspaper and electronic 
media. In order to combat the growing influence of Awolowo’s newspaper, the 
Federal government established the Morning Post in 1961. In 1964, Premier of 
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the Western Region, Chief S. l. Akintola established the Sketch Newspapers to 
defend his own image against his erstwhile party leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo 
(Nwankwo et al., 1993: 19). Another significant feature of the period was the 
introduction of the Official Secrets Act of 1962. The law restricted access to offi-
cial information in the government. The Act made it an offence to release or 
publish classified information on national security ground. Similarly in 1964, a 
more draconian law (Newspaper Amendment Act of 1964) to gag the press was 
enacted. This law required in the registration of any newspaper the name of 
 proprietors, occupation, address and the name of newspaper. A fine of 100 pound 
or six months imprisonment was to be meted out to the offenders (Nwankwo et 
al., 1993: 21–22). It is significant to note that not only the colonial gag laws 
against the press were retained in the Nigerian Constitution, the post-independence 
gag laws promulgated by Nigerian government were similarly patterned after 
 British colonial style.
As the mouth organ of the opposition party, the NT did not escape the clutch 
of the gag law and arbitrary use of power by politicians in both the Federal and 
the Regional governments. Between 5 February 1964 and 6 January 1966 the NT 
office was invaded not less than ten times by the Police on the order of the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) led government in Western Region 
under the Premier Akintola (Suberu, 1989: 65–68). On 16 October 1964, the 
 editor of the NT, Ayo Ojewumi (Pen Atlanta) was sentenced to a prison term of 
six months. A fine of 500 pounds was imposed on the African Press limited, the 
publisher of the newspaper (Suberu, 1989: 65–68). Pen Atlanta’s conviction was 
for his biting editorial titled “Where Do We Go From Here,” which accused the 
Western Region government officials of corruption (Suberu, 1989: 69–72). This 
was not the only tribulation faced by the NT. In November 1965, the NNDP led 
government through the Western Region district councils banned in the region 
the buying, hawking, reading, storing and circulation of the NT and four other 
newspapers: West African Pilot, Nigerian Outlook, Daily Telegraph and Iwe  Irohin 
Yoruba- in the region. Worst still, the newspaper building was burned down on 
7 November, 1965 by political hoodlums apparently supporters of the NNDP 
(Suberu, 1989: 72–73).
But it should be noted that frequent harassment of the NT by the government 
was closely related to the role of the newspaper in partisan politics of the period. 
While there is no doubt that the NT was performing its social responsibility of 
the ‘watchdog,’ the newspaper activities and stories were also focused on muck-
raking the opposition parties and people opposed to the newspaper’s founder. In 
addition, the manner in which the newspaper carried stories of social and  political 
crises in the region was a concern for the ruling party in the region. Hence, the 
muzzling of the opposition press.
On 16 January 1966, Nigeria witnessed a bloody coup that swept the civilian 
government out of the power. Between 1966 and 1979, Nigeria was ruled by 
three different military regimes during which the thirty month civil-war—1967–
1970—was experienced. On hijacking the power, the first military regime headed 
by General Aguiyi-Ironsi suspended the Nigerian Constitution although retained 
sections 24 and 25 that dealt with fundamental human rights (Oseni, 1999: 58). 
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Although Ironsi proclaimed a state of emergency, he promulgated Newspapers 
Circulation Act No. 2 of 1966 that lifted the ban of the newspapers in Nigeria 
(Oseni, 1999). Six months later, another military regime came into power through 
a bloody coup d’état. The new regime headed by lieutenant-Colonel yakubu 
Gowon experienced much of cooperation from the press in its nascent stage 
 particularly, during the civil war. But by 1974, it became clear that the Gowon 
regime was anti-press. According to Abayomi (2003), “the media did not fare 
better under his military regime, since he came to power through force and, every 
civil society was brought under the jackboot.”
Perhaps the worst example of draconian measures against the press during 
Gowon’s regime was the celebrated case of Minere Amakiri. Amakiri, the  Nigerian 
Observer correspondent, who was flogged 24 strokes with the cane, had his hair 
cut with a broken bottle and detained by the aid-de-camp (ADC) to the governor 
Alfred Diete Spiff of River State. Amakiri was punished for publishing on the 
birthday of the governor a front-page story on an impending teachers’ strike in 
River State (Abayomi, 2003: 108–109; Oseni, 1999: 58–59; Nwankwo et al., 
1993: 25–26). A total cost of N10, 750 in damages was awarded Amakiri in a 
successfully prosecuted case (Abayomi, 2003: 108–109).
On 29 July 1975, Gowon’s regime was toppled by another military regime led 
by General Murtala Muhammed. The regime took control of the Daily Times by 
acquiring 60 per cent of its shares on 1 September 1975. In April 1976, the 
regime also took over the control of the Nigerian Television Authority and the 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (Nwankwo et al., 1993: 26). The Public 
Officers Protection against False Accusation Decree 11 of 1976 was issued before 
the end of that year. The promulgation of the draconian decree according to 
Okoye (2003) was in relation to the libelous publication against the Head of State 
General Murtala Muhammed by editor-in-chief of the Africa Spark Magazine, Dr. 
Abarogie Ohunbamu. A legal suit instituted by the Head of State to clear his 
name of the libel had not convened before he was killed in the abortive coup 
of 1976. Although the regime pardoned Ohunbamu, a repressive measure upon 
which subsequent gag laws were to be laid out (Okoye, 2003: 94).
Between 1 October 1979 and 31 December 1983, Nigeria entered the second 
republic and experienced a democratic system of government. The new admini-
stration headed by Alhaji Sheu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) 
inherited the Constitution from the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. The 1979 Constitu-
tion guaranteed fundamental human rights (including freedom of expression) of 
Nigerian citizens. But the second republic was not much different from the first 
republic (Abayomi, 2003: 112). A few factors were responsible for this. First, the 
period was marked by political intolerance and fierce competition among the 
political parties. Second, the period was also characterized by economic  corruption 
and mismanagement. Third, Nigerian press was once again trapped in the  quagmire 
of partisan politics. Fourth, as with the first republic, Nigerian politicians of the 
second republic were quick to tamper with and restrain press freedom. In the 
press war that ensued between the NPN and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), 
the NT and the Concord became the mouth organs of these rival political parties 
respectively. While the NT was promoting the image of its  publisher and founder 
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of the UPN, it devoted and squandered many pages at criticizing political  opponents. 
Similarly, the Concord owned by Chief Moshood Abiola, an NPN stalwart, became 
an open rival of NT.
The relationship between the Shagari government and the press was generally 
hostile. Two critical instances exemplified this. In 1980, the editor of the Daily 
Times and publisher of the “Grapevine” column was summoned to the floor of 
the Senate to disclose the source of his story titled, “MPs, Senators and Cards,” 
alleging that the senators were illicitly vying for contract from the executive 
branch (Nwankwo et al., 1993: 28). Although the lagos High Court presided over 
by Justice C. Ademola Johnson, had set aside the Senate summons, this was 
 over-ruled by the Court of Appeal, presided over by Justice Philip  Nnamaeka-Agu. 
Hence, the Court of Appeal’s decision set the precedence that a journalist may 
be called to disclose the source of his information.
Another case that further widened the gulf between the press and the Shagari 
administration was the case of the National Assembly correspondent of the  Nigeria 
Television Authority (NTA), Vera Ifudu who was sacked for tendering against the 
wish of the top officers of the NTA. Ifudu taped an interview in which Dr. Bukola 
Saraki announced the discovery of the missing N2.8 billion from the account of 
the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC). The suspension of the  journalist 
was critically condemned by the NT and the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NT, 
18 April 1980).
By the end of 1984, economic malfeasance, violence against political  opponents, 
election rigging and arbitrary violation of human rights had become rampant in 
Nigeria. All these became excuses for the military to stage another coup.
GOVERNMENT-MEDIA RElATIONS, 1984–1985
The Second Republic in Nigeria headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari came to an 
abrupt end on 31 December 1983. The economic policies and their grave 
 mismanagement as well as election rigging by the ruling party—NPN (Adesoji, 
2007: 265–266) were among excuses alleged by the military to stage a come-
back coup. According to Falola et al. (1994), “...it was a re-enactment of  experience 
of the Balewa period” that inevitably led to the overthrowing of the civilian 
administration in the Second Republic. The December 31 coup was led by a 
group of young soldiers headed by Major General Muhammad Buhari and  Brigadier 
General Tunde Idiagbon. Recognized indiscipline as the bane of the society, the 
new regime introduced a number of measures to sanitize the  putrefied society. 
This included the promulgation of obnoxious decrees, the introduction of War 
Against Indiscipline programme and the intensification of activities of the Nige-
ria Security Organization. With all these in the background, Nigeria entered the 
period of stifled human rights.
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THE BUHARI REGIME AND THE PRESS, 1984–1985
The Buhari administration rode into power on the crest of public support. The 
tremendous support and goodwill enjoyed by this administration at its nascent 
stage, was inarguably linked with the economic decay, corruption and political 
fraud that characterized the previous praetorian administrations. For the Nigerian 
Tribune (NT), the military intervention was a “welcome breather” (Sunday  Tribune: 
1 January, 1984) at a time when the civilian government had lost its credibility 
to rule. In its opinion, the NT described the crop of officers who seized the power 
as “courageous, dedicated, selfless, serious and businesslike” (Sunday Tribune: 1 
January 1984). This assumption was made on the fact that the Buhari/Idiagbon 
regime did not impose emergency regulation when it seized power unlike their 
military predecessors (Sunday Tribune: 1984).
What seemed as a respite for Nigerians began to unravel when the new regime 
started to introduce stifling decrees. Of the decrees introduced by Buhari regime, 
Decrees 2, 4 and 20 were the cruelest. Decree 2 (DN2), the State Security 
( Detention of Persons) Decree 1984 states:
If the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters is satisfied that any person is 
or recently has been concerned in acts prejudicial to state security or has 
contributed to the economic adversity of the nation, or in preparation or 
instigation of such acts, and that by reasons thereof it is necessary to  exercise 
control over him, he may by order in writing direct that that person be 
detained in a civil prison or police station or such other place specified by 
him; ... (NT, 13 May 1984).
The DN2 was deplored by the NT for many reasons. First, the decree was not 
only a terrifying law but also vested in the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters 
Major General Tunde Idiagbon the right to detain any person if he “is satisfied” 
that the person constituted a threat to the State Security (NT, 9 March 1984: 2). 
Thus, the decision to arrest anybody rested with the discretion of Chief of Staff. 
Second, the decree failed to explain what constituted such discretion that was to 
be exercised by the Chief of Staff. Perhaps for effectiveness of the DN2, the 
FMG suspended Chapter IV of the 1979 Constitution that guaranteed  fundamental 
human rights. Also suspended were SECTIONS 219 and 269 of the constitution 
that dealt with court jurisdiction (NT, 9 March 1984). Third, the decree not only 
stripped Nigerians of their fundamental human rights but also denied them access 
to credible legal justice as the hand of the Judiciary was tightly tied.
Another decree that received biting criticisms from the NT was Decree 20 (DN 
20) otherwise known as the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal Decree 1984. Offences 
that could be tried under DN 20 were arson, sabotage, forgery, tampering with 
postal matter, illegal dealings and examination malpractices. Section 2(2) of the 
decree provided for the establishment of a tribunal with a Chairman who should 
be a Judge of the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State. It also 
 provided for three members of the armed forces not below the rank of major or 
its equivalent and a police officer. The penalty under this decree ranged from 
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imprisonment to death sentence (NT, 3 August 1984: 8, 9).
The reaction of the NT to these monstrous decrees was impassioned. In the 
first place the paper challenged the ambiguity with which the DN2 was promul-
gated. Accordingly, the paper asked “how and when does the Chief of Staff deter-
mine when someone’s action has been or is about to be prejudicial to state  security 
or is about to contribute to the economic adversity of the nation?” (NT, 3 August 
1984: 2). In its comment of 26 May 1984, the paper argued that the DN2 was 
unnecessary:
If the military government found this particularly objectionable and  obnoxious 
decree necessary when it took office, there is now no jurisdiction for it. 
This is because this government ought to have sufficiently established its 
authority and hold to be able to tolerate dissent. The existing laws are 
 adequate to deal with criminals. It is unnecessary therefore to continue to 
detain people without trial (NT, 26 May 1984).
Perhaps the most draconian decree promulgated by the Buhari regime was 
Decree 4 otherwise known as Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusa-
tion) Decree of 1984 (DN4). Section 1 (1) of the Decree states:
Any person who publishes in any form, whether written or otherwise, any 
message, rumour, statement or report which is false in any material  particular 
or which brings or is calculated to bring the Federal Military Government 
or the Government of a State or a public officer to ridicule or disrepute, 
shall be guilty of an offence under this decree (Official Gazette Extraordi-
nary, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 4 April 1984).
This decree above all empowered the Head of the Federal Military  Government 
(FMG) when he was arbitrarily satisfied that publication of any newspaper might 
be inimical to the interest of the Federation to prohibit its circulation of that news-
paper. Section 3(1) of the decree placed the burden of proving truthfulness of the 
message, rumour, report or statement on the person charged. Section 7 of the decree 
meted a maximum of two years imprisonment on the offender  without an alterna-
tive of fine and N10,000 fine in the case of a corporate body. Also in the case of 
body corporate, everybody who was a proprietor, publisher, general manager,  editor, 
secretary or other similar officer at the time of commission of the alleged offence 
would be guilty unless he could prove his innocence or  having diligently exercised 
caution (NT, 21 April, 1984; Official Gazette Extraordinary, Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 4 April 1984). In addition to any other penalty, the equipment of such 
corporate body was to be forfeited to the FMG. Besides, the decree denied appeal 
against any decision taken by the Tribunal established under this decree.
Although it is not clear why the Buhari regime decided to gag the press,  certain 
reasons can be suggested here. The decision by Buhari to promulgate DN4 was 
a response in the allegation leveled against his office by Dr. Olusola Saraki of 
the NNPC’s missing N2.8 billion while Buhari was Minister of Petroleum under 
the regime (NT, 1 December 1985).(3) It also has claimed that few days into his 
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regime in February 1984, General Buhari explicitly stated in an interview granted 
to three senior editors of Concord Newspaper that he would tamper with freedom 
of the press (NT, 1 December 1985).
Another statement which was also calculated to prepare the press for the tough 
time ahead was made by the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Major  General 
Tunde Idiagbon. In his press briefing of 9 February 1984, he said:
I wish to end by reminding you that it cannot be in the interest of the 
public who you so often claim the right to inform, for you to publish 
 sensational stories by fugitives who are only out to embarrass the govern-
ment… any person who publishes or reproduces in any form, any  statement; 
rumour or report being a statement which is proved to be false has himself 
to be blamed. This administration believes that the press should be allowed 
to publish facts but it will not accept obvious untruth intended to cause 
disaffection... (NT, 1 December 1985).
Historically however, contemptible, DN4 was not the first gagging decree pro-
mulgated by the military to suffocate the press in Nigeria. Decree 11 (Public 
Officers Protection Against False Accusation) promulgated on 11 March 1976 by 
the administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo had striking similarity with the 
DN4. First, the two decrees bore the same name. Second, both decrees were very 
close in content. Third, the penalty for the two decrees was almost the same. For 
instance, both decrees imposed a jail term not more than two years on the offender 
(NT, 21 April 1984).
Despite these similarities, the two decrees were different in some respects. First, 
the enforcement of DN4 was vested in the hands of Special Tribunal established 
under section 1, sub-section 4 of the decree. This was not so for DN11 as the 
enforcement of this decree was within the jurisdiction of the Court. Not only 
that, DN4 was different from DN11 in that it ordered, in addition to any other 
penalties, the confiscation of all or any equipment of the media that violated the 
decree. Worst still, in contrast to DN11, anybody who at the time of the  commission 
of the offence was a proprietor, publisher, general manager, editor, secretary or 
other similar officer of the corporate body would be guilty of that offence unless 
he could prove that the offence was committed without his consent.
The interpretations by, and opinions of, both journalists and non-journalists on 
the promulgation of DN4 by the FMG varied. In its opinion poll titled “Decree 
4: Hangman of Press Freedom,” the NT captured opinions as expressed by both 
journalists and non-journalists (NT, 6 May 1984). The Managing Director of the 
Daily Sketch, Segun Osoba described the DN4 not only a terrible legislation but 
also a harbinger of the end of investigative journalism. In the opinion of Felix 
Adenaike, the former NT editor-in-chief of the DN4 was “a needless piece of 
legislation.” Dr. Olu Onagoruwa, former legal adviser to the Daily Times, 
 commented that DN4 attempted to place public officers above the law and civil 
servant in a special class. The military interpretation of the DN4 was explicitly 
stated by Military Governor of Oyo State, Oladayo Popoola:
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The decree wants the Nigerian journalist of today to investigate rather than 
speculate. It wants him to give the pride of place to truth, honesty, fairness 
and justice. It wants his reports to be authoritative and respectable (NT, 7 
June 1984).(4)
The governor further argued that such decree as the DN4 was essential to 
strengthen the media role of projecting mass communication and mass support. 
Therefore, in his opinion, it would be a misunderstanding of DN4 to assume that 
the FMG wanted to stifle the press. To the journalists, such argument by Popoola 
would appear to be eloquently bogus, yet it provided alternative interpretation of 
the DN4.
The government-media relation under Buhari regime could be well understood 
and appreciated if situated within the authoritarian media theory and the social 
responsibility theory. In the first place the regime displayed features that were 
characteristics of the sixteenth and seventeenth century European dictatorial 
 governments. The introduction of DN4 was strikingly similar to the European 
method of sedition trial. Although libel and sedition trials were introduced to 
Nigeria in the colonial period, the promulgation of DN4 received wide publicity 
and enjoyed notoriety that no other decree or repressive measure rivaled. Also, 
the miasma of fear hung over the journalists like a spell and created a sudden 
sense of defeat and loss of freedom, particularly when the FMG punished Tunde 
Thompson and Nduka Irabor as the first scapegoats of the DN4.
The government-media relation under the regime also demonstrated repulsive 
features of patent and journeyman systems of authoritarian media theory. The 
announcement on 9 June 1984 by Group Captain Emeka Omeruah, Minister of 
Information, Social Development, youth, Sport and Culture, (NT, 12 June 1984) 
one the possible introduction of Press Council not only testified to the  authoritarian 
tendency of the regime but also created a phantom image that scared the press. 
The press roundly condemned the proposal. The NT boldly admonished the regime 
that definite failure was awaiting the Press Council. This speculation was rooted 
in the allegation of the exclusion of journalists from such council in the past 
(NT, 13 June 1984).(5) To the press, membership composition of the council in 
the past was obviously imbalanced gagging the press and persecuting journalists. 
But it is significant to note that the Press Council proposed by the regime was 
meant to act as arbiter between the FMG and the Nigerian press.
Another testimony of the repressive tendency of the government towards the 
Nigerian press could be found in the statement of Major General Muhammad 
Buhari, the Head of State. He declared in a special Radio Nigeria programme 
declared:
People from the southern part of the country, a few of them of course, own 
newspapers. We are aware of the views they express either of their  proprietors 
or otherwise, but we are watching all these with keen interest since Decree 
4 is still in force… If they over step their bounds we will close down their 
papers…(this administration would not) allow irresponsible views capable 
of creating instability or trouble in whatever form being published by these 
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private newspaper. So for other sections of the country which have no such 
private newspapers they should have nothing to worry about since we are 
not going to allow these papers to publish news and views against public 
interest (NT, 11 August 1985).
This remark from the Head of State further enhanced the image of Press  Council 
as terrifying monster to the Nigerian press. The purpose of DN4 was to randomly 
suffocate private newspapers particularly those of southern origin, depicting the 
autocratic tendency of the regime.
Despite placing such monstrous arrangements to muzzle the press, the regime 
claimed its readiness to welcome constructive criticism of government action. One 
official commented on the issue of the DN4 “...one we don’t think is an offence.” 
(NT, 26 July 1985). In fairness to the regime, the promulgation of the DN4 was 
also meant to cultivate the culture of investigative reporting in Nigerian journal-
ists a departure from the hitherto speculative reporting which ran contrary to the 
principle of objectivity claimed by the press (NT, 7 June 1984). In an interview 
granted the West Africa and published in its 27 February 1984, General Buhari 
explicitly stated:
I have told the press in one of my interviews that we do not stop anybody 
from publishing the truth – you cannot suppress the truth in any way, but 
we are not going to accept a deliberate attempt by some members of the 
press to publish stories that are absolutely untrue where they know it is 
untrue… If they cannot discipline themselves, then the government has to 
come in...
Thus, the regime probably intended the imposition of the DN4 to check the 
press that had failed to exercise self-censorship.
Another reason for the promulgation of the DN4 was probably to enhance with 
the security and stability of the country. Perhaps, the regime took to heart acted 
the lessons of the past when private newspapers were used as the instrument of 
ethnic jingoism and disaffection in the country. In a sense, the press could not 
really be exonerated from the regional and national chaos of the 1960s in  Nigeria. 
Thus, the introduction of DN4 became imperative in Nigeria for the Buhari regime 
to correct the media culture in the face of political chaos, economic prostration 
and ethnic rivalry that antedated it.
The NT in its campaign against the obnoxious DN4 adopted different tactics. 
The paper dedicated its comments, opinions, cartoons and different columns to 
wage war on its imposition. In its comment, “Gag Tactics,” it reminded the 
 military that they were not better patriots than doctors, lawyers and journalists. 
The paper interpreted the stifling of the press freedom as the curtailment of 
 individual freedom (NT, 4 March 1984). Also in its comment, “Decree 4,” the 
NT declared DN4 as “draconian, unnecessary and superfluous.” It further stated 
“If we had Decree 4 before last December 31, it would have been impossible to 
expose the wrongdoings of Shagari’s administration.” (NT, 22 April 1984).
Besides, the NT also judiciously made use of cartoons to project its opinions 
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on the DN4. In its edition of 4 June 1984, the NT depicted DN4 as a monstrous 
lion under which corrupt officers scared of the eagle eyes of the press could seek 
cover (NT, 4 June 1984).(6) This was one example of how the paper made use 
of cartoons to instill confidence in Nigerian journalists. For instance, in its  edition 
of 8th June 1984 the paper encouraged journalists with a cartoon not to fear DN 
4 an stressed that “the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom.” (NT, 7 June 
1984)(7) In another cartoon, the NT asked rhetorically “When will the power that 
be allow the dog to grow its teeth?” (NT, 8 June 1985). As a reminder to the 
dearth of press freedom, the paper ran in its ‘Weekend Topic’ the diary of “The 
birth and death of Decree 4.” (NT, 1 December 1985)(8) Beside the in-depth 
 analysis of DN4 was a cartoon depicting journalists celebrating the exit of the 
Buhari regime with its hang man law, DN4.
A TEMPORARy BREATHER: THE BABANGIDA REGIME, 1985–1993
When on 27 August 1985 Major General Sani Abacha announced Major  General 
Ibrahim Babangida as President and new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, the agonized people of Nigeria initially doubted that a well fortified  fascist 
regime of Buhari could come into abrupt end (Peretei, 2004: 63). This in no 
doubt was a temporary breather for Nigerian people. As if a new bride seeking 
the favour of her in-laws, the Babangida regime pretentiously posed as a bene-
volent dictatorship. But it soon became abundantly clear that the August 1985 
 palace coup was just a change of wine rather than the dirty bottle, as there was 
little departure from the old order.
Having identified the flaws of the previous regime, Babangida regime employed 
different strategies to court the acceptance of the people and to gain credibility. 
First, the regime repealed the notorious Public Officers (Protection against False 
Accusation) Decree No. 4 of 1984 and unconditionally released those detained 
under the decree (NT, 1 December 1985). Again to show his magnanimity, on 
1 October 1985, President Babangida granted amnesty to about 294 prisoners 
from Oyo and Bendel prisons (NT, 8 October 1985). These benevolent acts not 
only endeared the new regime to the people but also motivated the press to 
shower encomium on it. On 3 September 1985, the NT featured a cartoon titled 
“Beautiful Bride Again?” in which the caricature of President Babangida was 
romancing the Press, a maiden, while that of Buhari watched in utter regret (NT, 
3 September 1985). Also in its issue of 1 December 1985 the NT ran a story 
celebrating the death of DN 4 and the exit of Buhari regime. The paper quoted 
side by side the Babangida magnanimous speech that abrogated the Buhari’s DN 
4. But all the romance soon faded out.
A great shudder ran through the press spine when a colourful and gifted 
 journalist and first editor-in-chief of the Newswatch magazine, Mr. Dele Giwa 
was assassinated, using a parcel bomb on 19 October, 1986 (Peretei, 2004: 69). 
In its comment of 23 October 1986, the NT not only decried the monstrosity 
demonstrated by the gruesome murder but also urged the Federal Government to 
bring the killers to justice. Four year later, the NT in another comment lamented 
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the indifference of the government to such monstrous incident and urged Presi-
dent Babangida to reactivate the investigation into Dele Giwa’s murder (NT, 28 
October 1990). The first sign of subversion became visible when on 6  September 
1987, the regime banned the Newswatch magazine for six months for publishing 
the report of the Political Bureau (NT, 7 April 1987). The regime also promul-
gated thee so called Newswatch Decree (Proscription and Circulation Decree 6) 
of 1987 (NT, 11 April 1987). In response to the widespread premonition of the 
possible return of DN 4, President Babangida dismissed this as rumour. He stated 
categorically that, “I wish to take this opportunity to reassure not only the media 
practitioners but also the entire nation that this administration will not bring back 
Decree Four.” The NT ran a balanced comment on the Newswatch affair (NT, 23 
April 1987). The paper neither supported the report carried by the Newswatch 
nor backed the promulgation of DN 6 by the government. Although the NT blamed 
the Newswatch editors for not exercising good judgment, still it described the 
proscription as “the most draconian step to take.”
Another strategy adopted by the regime was to buy off dissenting journalists 
and professional associations such as the Nigerian Union of Journalist (NUJ). 
Despite the pro-government stand of the Daily Times and the New Nigerian, the 
government dismissed the managing directors, Dr. yemi Ogunbiyi and Mr.  Haruna 
Muhammed of the two papers, respectively, and replaced them with “stooges” 
(Olukotun, 2005: 7–8). Other subversive measures by the regime included inces-
sant arrests of journalists and the use of security agents to terrorize the press. 
The indiscriminate detention of journalists was strongly condemned by the NT.
The NUJ also became the victim of the Babangida regime shenanigans. The 
simmering crisis that rocked the NUJ in 1992 due to with N1.7 million grant 
from the regime for the NUJ supporting its conference in Calabar. Commenting 
on the origin and implication of this crisis, the NT argued that such a grant would 
not only cause dissension among the journalists but also compromise the NUJ as 
the symbol of public watchdog (NT, 2 July 1992).
Of equal significance was the Babangida regime’s retention of the egregious State 
Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984 and Miscellaneous Offences 
Decree No. 20 of 1984 from the previous Buhari regime. The NT in a comment, 
“Unrepealed Decrees,” identified its fear of and danger in the retention of these 
repressive decrees (NT, 17 November 1985). The paper stated that unless this DN2 
was repealed by the Federal Government, “it is safe to assume that the inalienable 
rights of Nigerians can be breached at will” (NT, 17 November 1985).
The paper asked the Federal Government to use DN 20 which prescribed death 
sentence for a number of offences, “to address the root cause of socio-economic 
crises, rather than their criminal manifestations” (NT, 17 November 1985).
In spite of public outcry against these draconian decrees the regime retained 
them to shield its subversive actions. Hence, it became clear to the press that the 
self-acclaimed human rights protector, President Babangida was less than  forthright 
(NT, 20 July 1992). It was not until January 1990 that the regime took a  palliative 
measure to amend the vexatious DN 2. The amended decree made the Chief of 
Staff (CGS) the only signatory to any detention order, unlike before when the 
Inspector General of Police and the Minister of Internal Affairs possessed such 
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authority. Also, the length of detention was reduced from six months to six weeks. 
The amendment also inaugurated an eight-man panel headed by Attorney General 
and Minister of Justice, Prince Bola Ajibola, to review the cases of detainees 
(NT, 20 July 1992). Although the NT commended the amendment of the DN 2 
which “constitutes a practical demonstration of this regime’s responsiveness to 
the opinion of the public,” it nonetheless objected to the retention of the decree 
because of its vexatious provisions and application (NT, 17 November 1985).
Besides, another venue sought by the regime to manipulate the press was 
through the establishment of the Nigerian Press Council (NPC). The origin of 
the NPC could be traced to 1968 when the Federal Government summoned a 
 commission headed by an eminent lawyer, Aliyi Ekineh, to ponder on the future 
of the Nigerian Press, (NT, 2 February 1989: 8–9). Until the late 1980’s, efforts 
to establish an acceptable NPC fell through for a number of reasons. The 
 composition of membership of the 1978 NPC was not acceptable to the Nigerian 
journalists because the power to select or nominate was vested entirely in the 
Minister of Information.(9) The Nigerian Press was hostile to the NPC Decree 31 
of 1978 because it only provided for complaints by the aggrieved against the 
journalists, without giving the journalists opportunity to air their grievances. Thus, 
the newborn NPC was regarded as a coup against the Press. The promulgation 
of DN 31, Nigerian Press Council Decree that heralded the new organization 
excluded journalists from any participation received serious criticism. The inepti-
tude of the NPC was carried over till 1990. In fairness to the press, the com-
position of the NPC membership was initially biased against the press. The 
 indifference and firm resistance launched against the NPC by the Nigerian press 
was a clear testimony of intolerance of the press against any external assessor of 
its conduct.
The opposition of the press to Decree No. 59, otherwise known as Nigerian 
Media Council Decree of 1988 was also very strong. As with the DN 31 of 1978, 
DN 59 contained many objectionable provisions for the press. The main foci were 
three Sections 17, 18 and 20 that determined registration of journalists, penalty 
for unprofessional conduct and required approval of qualifications and institutions 
respectively. Significantly, the stalemate over the NPC decree could not be divorced 
from the dissension among the leaders of the professional bodies of the press, 
policies inconsistencies and lack of focus on the part of NUJ (NT, 26 Febru-
ary1988: 3). In its comment, “The Media Court,” the NT condemned the incon-
sistencies of Tony Momoh, who as a journalist vigorously campaigned against 
the objectionable parts of the NPC decrees but shifted ground when he assumed 
the position of Minister of Information (NT, 2 February 1989: 3).
The NT opposed the government-imposed NPC, but preferred a media council 
set up by journalists that would itself regulate the conduct of its members. The 
paper submitted that, “the press does not require a special law to protect or  punish 
its members. Journalists are not special breed of Nigerians and therefore need no 
special protection...” Still on the NPC, the NT blamed NUJ for the government 
involvement in the establishment of the NPC saying NUJ lacked professionalism 
and proficiency, and that it preferred to wear the “toga” of unionism rather than 
enforce its code of ethics (NT, 15 January 1988: 7; NT, 7 June 1990: 9).
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Still, the paper lauded the amendment of the DN 59 which eventually led to 
the inauguration of a 17-man board headed by Alhaji Alade Odunewu. Not only 
were the five principal functions of the NPC acceptable to the paper, it  encouraged 
and gave advice on the amended NPC. Accordingly, the NT stated that, “the new 
Press Council should have the courage to act in truth and fairness from time to 
time. It should not protect the interests of the government or the media at the 
expense of the public interest.” (NT, 19 January 1993: 11).
The NT was also at the fore-front of human rights agitation during the period 
of transition into the Third Republic. With the promulgation of Decree No. 19 
of 1987 the populist democratic programme of the Babangida regime commenced 
(Peretei, 2004: 68). Through Political Parties Registration and Activities Decree 
27 of 1989, the president imposed two parties, the National Republican Conven-
tion (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), to replace 13 political asso-
ciations (Ajayi, 1995: 70). The government also rescheduled the end of transition 
to end in January, 1993 as against its initial promise of 1990. As the date for 
the presidential election approached, President Babangida in his cunning tactics 
created a stalemate to postpone the presidential election. He cancelled the presi-
dential primaries of the SDP and NRC with the allegation of rigging and other 
malpractices. The NRC and SDP flag bearers, General Sheu Musa yaradua and 
Alhaji Umar Shinkafi, respectively, left their post. The NT referred to this as “a 
hidden agenda” on the part of Babangida regime. (NT, 8 January 1990: 7). Hence, 
Option A4 in Transition Programme was introduced dictating that the presidential 
aspirant must first win his ward, local government, and state before contesting at 
the federal level (Peretei, 2004: 71). In this influx, Chief M.K.O. Abiola and 
Alhaji Bashir Tofa emerged as the presidential candidate for SDP and NRC respec-
tively. President Babangida again tinkered with the Transition Programme and 
rescheduled the Presidential election to 12 June 1993 and the inauguration to 27 
August 1993 (Ajayi, 1995: 71). Braving the odds, the NT warned that  subterranean 
moves to remaining in office beyond 1992 would run Babangida regime “out of 
steam, momentum, ideas and drift” (NT, 17 June 1990: 3).
The realization that the war against the press could not be won by coercion 
and intimidation alone probably spurred President Babangida to sponsor different 
organizations which would not only front his course but also cause confusion in 
the country. These organization included, the “Third Eye” coordinated by Chief 
Akanni Aluko; the “Committee of Elder Statesmen” headed by S.G. Ikoku, Tanko 
yakassai, Tola Adeniyi and Margaret Ekpo; the “Committee of Concerned  Citizens” 
led by Remi Ilori; the “Association for Better Nigeria,” led by Arthur Nzeribe 
and Dr. Keith Atkins (Mimiko, 1995: 95). These associations were anti-democratic 
as well as chaotic. They specifically chanted “Babangida-must-stay” and worked 
towards hampering democracy. On 14 June 1993, the Association for Better  Nigeria 
even went to Abuja High Court to protest the conduct of the June 12 election. 
The regime openly made use of propaganda as well. Hence, the Nigerian  Television 
Authority (NTA), the New Nigeria and the Daily Times became the potent instru-
ments utilized by the unpopular regime to cause confusion and front its hidden 
agenda (Olukotun, 2005: 54–55).
Perhaps the worst blunder committed by the regime was the annulment of the 
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result of the June 12 presidential election in which Chief M.K.O. Abiola was 
reportedly the winner. Nigerians were shocked by the annulment of the fairest 
and freest election in the history of Nigeria, and the press launched open  criticism 
of the Babangida regime. The NT was particularly critical of the annulment of 
June 12 election by the regime. As Adesoji observed:
Beyond seeing the June 12 issue as a watershed and a revolution whose 
gains must be protected and sustained, the paper did not see the June 12 
issue as an opportunity to take back its own pounds of flesh from Chief 
M.K.O. Abiola … who used the instrumentality of the Concord to pull down 
the proprietor of the NT, Chief Awolowo and jeopardize his political  carrier 
in the 1980’s (Adesoji, 2007: 299).
Even after the exit of Babangida from the government the NT did not relent 
in its efforts to uphold the June 12 mandate. In its comment “Probing the June 
12 Election,” the NT described the establishment of the commission of inquiry 
into the June 12 saga by the Interim National Government (ING) as a charade, 
if not a fraud, as the people who constituted the ING government were the same 
old wine in the new bottle.  
THE ABACHA ERA, 1993–1998
The fundamental human rights of Nigerians remained under siege even after 
the exit of Babangida from power. The Interim National Government (ING) that 
succeeded Babangida administration was a lame duck institution, although it may 
have struggled to uphold human rights. A number of reasons could be attributed 
to this. First, the ING was an extension of Babangida regime and possessed no 
mandate of the people. Since the regime that created it lacked credibility, people 
had no particular confidence in the ING (NT, 13 October 1993: 9). Also the 
 people that constituted the National Defense Security Council (NSDC) were either 
members of the former military regime or its sympathizers. Moreover, the ING, 
given its short duration, lacked focus. lastly, the imposition of the ING on  Nigeria 
by President Babangida was to underscore the inability and non-preparation of 
the civilians to take the responsibility of ruling the country democratically ( Mimiko, 
1995: 84–97). On 17 November 1993, the Secretary of NSDC as well as  Minister 
of Defense under Babangida regime, General Sani Abacha dismissed the Head of 
ING, Chief Ernest Shonekan, and took over the reins of power himself. Thus, 
Nigeria entered the worst period of human rights violation since 1960.
like its predecessor, the Abacha regime tried to court popular support in the area 
of human rights during its nascent stage. For instance, the regime launched the War 
Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC) on 4 May 1994, to restore discipline 
and morality to different sphere of societal life including home and school (NT, 18 
May 1994: 9). The second phase of the WAIC was launched amidst elaborate 
 ceremony and fanfare to ensure environmental sanitation and habit of cleanliness 
(NT, 8 November 1994: 9). As the NT observed, the WAIC campaign was a tall 
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order. So endemic was corruption in Nigeria that it ridiculed the country both at 
home and abroad. The NT reacted to an investigative report in the 60 Minutes 
 programme by the CBS TV in the United States. Since the TV programme revealed 
the grave state of corruption in Nigeria, the NT warned, “if the government is 
 serious about War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC)…this is the time to 
demonstrate it” (60 Minutes of Corruption. NT, 5 January 1995: 7).
The pattern of relationship between the press and state already badly frayed 
by the Babangida regime was further aggravated by the Abacha regime. In his 
maiden press briefing of 14 April 1994, General Abacha promised that his admini-
stration would uphold press freedom. He would blaze a new trail in press- 
government relations “by guaranteeing a free and unimpeded access to news and 
information, no matter how dangerous the designs of some journalists to embar-
rass the government (Abacha. NT, 22 April 1994: 13). The same night he made 
this speech, the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) announced in its Network 
News that Abacha had ordered the release of Ray Ekpu, Dan Agbese and yakubu 
Mohammed, all of the Newswatch magazine (NT, 21 April 1994: 9).
The promise of the benign press-government relationship soon proved to be a 
forlorn hope as the regime unleashed terror not only on the press but the whole 
Nigerian society. The offices of the Punch and the Concord, were searched by 
the police on 10 June for allegedly stockpiling arms in their premises (That Search 
for Arms. NT, 17 June 1994: 9). The NT deplored this incident irregular and 
 illegal. In August 1994, Decree 8 (the Guardian Newspapers and African  Guardian 
Weekly Magazine Proscription from Circulation Decree), was promulgated to 
muzzle sections of the press if it seemed too audacious for the Abacha regime 
(Olukotun, 2005: 65).
The notorious DN 2 (Public Officers Protection Decree) of 1984 and DN2 
(Civil Disturbances Tribunal Decree) of 1987, inherited from the previous admini-
strations, were not only retained but were also seriously utilized by the regime. 
Many journalists and human rights activists who agitated for the return of civil 
rule were persecuted under these decrees. Moreover, many human rights activists 
were coldly murdered by the unpopular regime. Ken Saro Wiwa, President of the 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People with eight others were tried and 
sentenced to death by hanging under the DN2 of 1987 (Peretei, 2004: 99; NT, 5 
November 1995: 14). Pa Alfred Ogbeyiwa Rewane on October 6 1995 and Alhaja 
Kudirat Abiola, wife of Chief M.K.O. Abiola on 4 June 1996, were killed in 
what was believed to be state-sponsored assassinations (NT, 6 June 1996: 7). The 
NT in a full page comment condemned the dastardly killing of Alhaja Kudirat 
and urged the Federal Military Government to bring the perpetrators of the  horrible 
act to justice (Kudirat Killing. NT, 10 June 1996: FII).
In addition to the above was the orgy of violence, bomb terrorism and allega-
tions of various crimes to the opposition by the unpopular regime. Twice during 
the Abacha regime, there were allegations of coup d’etats, first in 1995 and later 
in 1997. While Col. lawan Gwadabe was fingered as the leader of the 1995 
coup, (Peretei, 2004: 89) other victims of the coup allegations included General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, General Sheu yar’ Adua and Dr. Beko Ransome Kuti 
( Olukotun, 2002: 71). Some activist journalists were also roped in. These included 
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Chris Anyanwu, publishers of TSM magazine, Ben Obi, editor of Classique 
 magazine, Kunle Ajibade, editor of News magazine and George Mbah, assistant 
editor of Tell magazine (Olukotun, 2002: 71). Many military officers and  civilians 
were accused in the 1997 coup. These includded Chief of General Staff, General 
Oladipupo Diya, Minister of Works, General Abdul Kareem Adisa, General 
Tajudeen Olanrewaju and other prominent people (Peretei, 2004: 89–90). The 
death of General Abacha on 8 June 1998 in a hazy circumstance and emergence 
of General Abdulsalam Abubakar as the new Head of State saved the lives of 
the accused coup plotters.
CONClUSION
The intrusion of the military into governance in Nigeria and its long period of 
rule were a trying period for fundamental human rights and press freedom. The 
suspension of the constitution by the military and caging of the judiciary not only 
posed immediate challenges to the press but also made it the only alternative 
court of appeal for the masses when the three Estates of the Realm were  suspended. 
The NT to a very large extent played this role adequately well, fulfilling in the 
process its social responsibility to human rights agitation.
The intolerance of press freedom was further demonstrated under the Buhari 
regime when stifling decrees were promulgated. Specifically, the promulgation of 
DN 4 by the Buhari regime was to contain the excesses of the press that failed 
to regulate itself. The promulgation of DN 2 and DN 20 violated the  fundamental 
human rights of many Nigerians, but were purposed to rid Nigeria of socio- 
economic malaise such as corruption, smuggling and of indiscipline that had 
bedeviled the country beginning from the Shagari administration and beyond. This 
is not to absolve the regime itself of nepotism, as the trial of politicians was 
mostly selective. Nevertheless, the decrees were timely applied despite its  overdose 
on the society.
Significantly, subsequent regimes that declared their support for press freedom 
did so after studying the psychology of the Nigerian press as fully egotistic and 
selfish, an institution that enjoyed judging the conduct of other institutions but 
disliked being evaluated. This weakness was quickly exploited by the Babangida 
regime which subtly subjected the Nigerian press to manipulation. The  abrogation 
of the DN 4, for instance, by the regime was to temporarily pacify and divert 
the press. It was therefore not surprising when the same DN 4 reappeared in the 
 monstrous shape of the Newswatch (Prohibition and Circulation) DN 6 of 1987. 
The heinous murder of Dele Giwa of Newswatch and the clamping down on 
media houses were among other atrocities committed by the Babangida regime. 
The same autocratic tendency thing applied to the Abacha regime. As with the 
Babangida regime, it declared its tolerance to press criticism and later unleashed 
its whips not only on the press but also on other human rights activists and the 
Nigerian society at large. Perhaps no government in the history of Nigeria, whether 
military or civilian, was as notorious as the Abacha regime as far as the  violation 
of human rights and other vices were concerned.
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NOTES
 (1) Siebert et al. also asked: Why is the press as it? Why does it apparently serve, different 
purposes and appear in widely different forms in different countries? Why is the press of 
the Soviet Union different from our own, and the press of Argentina different from that 
of Great Britain?
 (2) John Milton in his essay Areopagitica directed at the British Parliament in 1644 “if ye be 
thus resolved ... to yourselves; by judging over again that Order which ye have ordained 
to regulate printing—that no book, pamphlet or paper shall be henceforth printed unless 
the same be first approved and licensed by such, or at least of such, as shall be thereto 
appointed.”
 (3) A senator in the Second Republic, Dr. Olusola Saraki alleged on the National Assembly 
that N2.8 billion was missing from the coffers of the NNPC which was “accidentally” 
under the auspices of Ministry of Petroleum headed by Buhari in the Obasanjo regime. 
Disappointingly, the reporter that aired the report on the NTA Network News was 
 thereafter fired.
 (4) This quotation is an excerpt from the speech delivered by Governor Oladayo Popoola in 
the annual General Meeting of the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria.
 (5) The Nigerian Tribune was referring to the Press Council established by Decree 31 under 
Obasanjo regime.
 (6) DN 4 was caricatured as a under which an officer who privated the public coffers hid 
from the press.The press was presented as a terrifying black bat in the cartoon.
 (7) In this cartoon a preacher in white attire held a bell in one hand and a volume of book 
marked Decree 4. He was preaching to a crowd presumably journalists not to be scared 
of DN 4 but apply their wisdom.
 (8) “Weekend Topic” was a Sunday extra with in-depth analysis of various events.
 (9) With the exception of the Chairman which was to be appointed on the recommendation 
of the Minister of Information, other members of the Council were to be nominated by 
the Minister.
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